The paper studies the evolution of coordination in a local interaction model where agents can simultaneously choose the strategy to play in the game and the size of their neighborhood. We focus on pure-coordination games played by agents located on one-dimensional lattices when network externalities become eventually negative as neighborhood sizes increase. We show that the society almost always converge to steady-states characterized by high levels of coordination and small neighborhood sizes. Furthermore, we …nd that neighborhood adjustment allows for higher coordination than if interaction structures were static and that large populations attain higher coordination provided that average initial neighborhood sizes are not too small. Finally, we explore how long-run patterns of coordination change when: (i) agents possibly enjoy positive network externalities as neighborhood sizes increase; (ii) individuals are placed in higher-dimensional lattices; (iii) agents play coordination games where a trade-o¤ arises between Pareto-e¢cient and risk-dominant Nash equilibria.
Introduction
The outcome of a coordination game repeatedly played in large societies might be crucially a¤ected by the coevolution between interaction structures and individual choices.
In the last years, this issue has been investigated in an evolutionary game setting by assuming exogenously …xed networks. In these models, agents are supposed to repeatedly play a 2 £ 2 coordination game either against any other player in the population (cf. Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993) and Young (1996) ) or against a …xed, typically small, set of 'relevant others' (see Blume (1993) , Ellison (1993) and Young (1998) ). The basic rationale is that, in many situations, the time-scale at which agents choose their opponents in the game is very long as compared to that at which they update their stage-game strategies. Consequently, it may be plausible to study the long-run properties of population learning as if interaction structures were static (cf. Skyrms & Pemantle (2000) ).
However, the evolution of individual choices through time might also a¤ect agents' expectations about future payo¤s from interactions. A player might then change her idea on who is in fact 'relevant' and avoid further interactions (or, respectively, start interacting) with groups of other agents if she expects that this would lead to a decrease (or, respectively, an increase) in net payo¤s. In such circumstances, the speed at which agents revise the set of their partners is (at least) comparable to the frequency at which they update their strategy. Therefore, the details of the process governing the coevolution between strategies and interaction structures may have non-trivial consequences on long-run coordination patterns (see Kirman (1997) for a discussion).
To address this issue, we present here a dynamic model of coordination in which agents can simultaneously choose the strategy to play in the game and select the agents with whom to play the game. We consider a population of myopic individuals located on a circle who repeatedly play a pure coordination game with their 'nearest neighbors'. We assume that holding neighbors is costly and that, from time to time, agents are allowed to slightly shrink or enlarge the 'radius' of their current neighborhood by maximizing expected net payo¤s. Local neighborhood adjustment re ‡ects here the well documented inertia of many social relationships (see e.g. Miller (1963) and Akerlof (1997) ). We focus on settings characterized by network externalities which may be positive when agents hold small neighborhoods sizes, but become eventually negative when neighborhood sizes are very large (e.g. due to network congestion e¤ects).
After having characterized the set of steady states and conditions for convergence, we show that both full coordination and coexistence of conventions may be possible in the long-run. However, as computer simulations show, the system is able to robustly reach very high coordination levels together with small neighborhood sizes despite the presence of negative local network externalities. Moreover, we …nd that average coordination in presence of a non-zero (although small) frequency of neighborhood adjustment is higher than if interaction structures were static. Furthermore, we show that large societies better coordinate provided that initial average neighborhood sizes are su¢ciently high. Finally, we test the robustness of the model to departures from the basic setup. In particular, we study what happens to long-run patterns of coordination when agents: (i) might enjoy positive network externalities for all neighborhood sizes; (ii) are located in higher-dimensional lattices; (iii) play coordination stage-games where a trade-o¤ arises between Pareto-e¢cient and risk-dominant Nash equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related works and we discuss the extent to which our model departs from existing literature. In Section 3 we formally describe the model. Section 4 deals with the characterization of absorbing states in the basic setup, while computer simulation results on the average long-run behavior of the system are reported in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss extensions of the basic setup. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Coordination and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation
The issue of coordination in presence of endogenous partner selection has been recently addressed by Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001) , Jackson & Watts (2000) and Droste, Gilles & Johnson (2000) in the framework of network formation 1 . These models share four basic assumptions. First, agents are able to simultaneously update stage-game strategies and directly choose whom to interact with. Second, no underlying socio-economic geography prevents (or restricts) interactions between 'distant' agents. Players in Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001) and Jackson & Watts (2000) can indeed form or delete single costly links with any other agent in the population on the basis of myopic expectations about the future net bene…t from coordination in alternative network structures. On the contrary, Droste et al. (2000) assume players located on a circle and suppose that the probability of a link between any two agents decreases with their distance. Nevertheless, players can potentially observe the current strategy of any other agent in the population before choosing whether to establish a link with her or not, irrespective of the distance between them.
Third, the speed at which agents can change their partners is the same as the pace at which they update their strategy. In fact, everytime a player is called to revise her current state, she can simultaneously change both her pure stage-game strategy and the set of partners (possibly in di¤erent stages of a same time period).
Finally, existing models study coordination and network formation in a positive network externalities setup. More speci…cally, they typically assume that the gross (i.e. before link costs) payo¤ to an agent playing a given strategy s is not a¤ected by the size of the network, provided that the number of connected players choosing s does not change. If the cost of forming a link is su¢ciently small, net payo¤s always increase as the size of the network (i.e. connected players choosing the same strategy) increases. On the contrary, if unit link costs are very large negative network externalities arise for all network sizes 2 . Therefore, there are no network size e¤ects on gross (and net) payo¤s and the regime of network externalities depends on the level of unit link costs.
In this paper, we present a dynamic, non-cooperative, model of coordination and neighborhood formation in which strategies and interaction structures are both subject to endogenous evolution. As happens in Droste et al. (2000) , we suppose that agents are spatially located on the nodes of a circle and play 2 £ 2 pure coordination games with their nearest neighbors. However, in contrast with existing models, we assume that in each time period players are allowed either to update their current pure strategy (given the current interaction structure) or, with some exogenously …xed probability, to simultaneously adjust strategies and neighbors. This allows us to study situations in which neighborhood adjustment is endogenous but relatively not frequent.
We suppose that players act myopically and update pure strategies and/or neighbors by best-responding to their current environment in a completely deterministic way (i.e. without mistakes) 3 . Unlike Droste et al. (2000) , we do not allow for 'jumps' in neighborhood adjustment. Indeed, we posit that agents update their neighbors' set by adding to (or discard from) it only those players who are located close to the boundaries of the neighborhood. More precisely, if an agent interacts at time t ¡ 1 with all individuals placed no farther than r > 1 nodes from her, she will only consider to locally adapt the radius of her neighborhood, i.e. shrink it to r ¡ 1, enlarge it to r + 1 or keep it unchanged, while simultaneously choosing whether to stick to her current strategy or not. As holding neighbors is assumed to be costly (total cost is proportional to neighborhood size), a player will simply adjust her current set of partners by comparing net payo¤s from coordination. In our model, the underlying geography strongly constrains the set of options available to any agent. In fact, the assumption that individuals cannot observe current choices of agents placed far from them implies that the choice set is quite small 4 . Furthermore, in contrast with existing literature assuming agents who directly select their partners in a sequence of one-to-one link additions/deletions, we suppose that players can only indirectly choose whom to interact with by adjusting their 'interaction window'. Finally, we study a setup where network externalities become eventually negative as neighborhood sizes increase. In particular, we assume that there exist (negative) neighborhood size e¤ects on gross payo¤s from interaction: an agent currently playing strategy s who faces two neighborhoods characterized by the same number of partners choosing s will earn a higher gross payo¤ if she chooses the smaller one. Therefore, given unit link costs, agents could be willing to enlarge their neighborhood size if the latter is relatively small, while they will eventually prefer to shrink it (no matter the local strategy con…gu-ration they face) if the number of neighbors goes beyond some endogenously determined threshold.
This property, together with the assumption that agents cannot refuse to play the game, allows us to address the issue of coordination in presence 'locally' positive but 'globally' negative network externalities. Indeed, in many circumstances well documented e.g. in the 'economics of the Internet' literature 5 , individual net payo¤s might eventually fall as the network size increases irrespective of pure strategies played by the agents either: (i) because of congestion problems entailed by the physics of the network; or (ii) because the net added value of any new player is negligible to each individual belonging to the network. In particular, players may prefer to avoid unwanted interactions as unknown agents may entail risks (e.g. a higher likelihood of computer viruses). Moreover, whenever agents are status seeking and aspire to be similar to their peers, individuals might dislike coordination if the group to which they belong becomes too crowded (see e.g. Cowan, Cowan & Swann (1998) ). We start by studying a basic setup where agents play a purely symmetric coordination game, i.e. a coordination game where both strategies are equivalent with respect to Pareto e¢ciency and risk-dominance. The goal is to study whether endogenous neighborhood formation alone has a signi…cant impact on long-run coordination, in presence of spatiallylocated agents who locally adapt their neighborhoods and strategies 6 . In particular, we will analyze the extent to which allowing for simultaneous adjustment of players' strategies and neighbors results in higher long-run average coordination, as compared to cases in which neighborhood structures are static. Furthermore, we explore how coordination and interaction structures are a¤ected by: (i) the speed of neighborhood adjustment; (ii) unit neighborhood costs; (iii) the strength of negative network externalities. Some interesting departures from the basic setup are instead discussed in Section 6.
The Model
Consider a …nite set of agents I = f1; 2; :::; Ng, N¸5. Agents are spatially distributed on the nodes of a 1-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries (i.e. a circle). We assume a one-to-one relation between the nodes of the lattice and the set of agents. Hence, individual labels i = 1; 2; :::; N coincide with locations on the circle. Time is discrete. At each t = 1; 2; ::: any agent plays a pure 2 £ 2 coordination game against her current partners. More precisely, if agent i plays s i 2 f¡1; 1g when agent j 0 s strategy is s j 2 f¡1; 1g; her stage-game payo¤ is given by:
Any agent i is completely characterized by her set of partners V it ½ I and her current strategy s it 2 S = f¡1; +1g. Following Ellison (1993), we assume that agent i's partners set consists of all players located within a neighborhood of radius r it : More formally:
where r it 2 R(N ) = f1; 2; :::; e rg and e r = bN=2c: As V it only depend on r it , we de…ne the state of any agent i at time t as:
The economy will be in turn characterized at any t by its global con…guration:
In each time period, an agent whose state is (s it ; r it ) will earn a (net) overall payo¤ de…ned as:
where G(s it ; s jt ) is de…ned in (1), jV (r it )j is the size of V (r it ) and¯> 0 is the unit cost per neighbor (i.e. the cost of keeping active at t the link to any agent j 6 = i).
Notice that the parameter ® 2 [0; 1] governs the nature of local network externalities in the model. To see why, let us consider two extreme cases. On the one hand, if ® = 0; there are no neighborhood size e¤ects on gross payo¤s (i.e. the term in square brackets): if the number of agents playing s it in V (r 0 ) and V (r 00 ) is the same, then gross payo¤s do not change. Therefore, if¯> 1 the system is characterized by 'always negative' network externalities because net payo¤s are strictly decreasing with r it (and thus with the number of agents playing s it in V ) irrespective of strategy con…guration. Conversely, if¯< 1 (and su¢ciently small) network externalities are 'always positive': net payo¤s are strictly increasing in the size of the network (i.e. in the number of players choosing s it in V (r it )) 7 .
On the other hand, if ® = 1; gross payo¤s from playing (s it ; r it ) are negatively a¤ected by the size of the neighborhood. For a given strategy con…guration, net payo¤s might increase if neighborhood sizes are not too large, because gross gains from local coordination can o¤set costs. However, they will eventually fall, irrespective of currently played strategies, as neighborhood size grows. In this case the system is potentially characterized by 'locally' positive and 'globally' negative network externalities.
In this paper, we will primarily focus on the latter case (® = 1). The behavior of the system when ® 2 [0; 1) is explored in Section 6.1. When ® = 1; as jV (r it )j = 2r it and G(s it ; s jt ) = 1 if and only if s it = s jt , payo¤s in (3) read:
where°= 2¯('unit cost', in the following) and x i (r it ) 2 [0; 1] is the share of agents in V (r it ) currently playing +1 ('local frequency' in the following). Let us turn now to describe the dynamics of the model. At the beginning of period t + 1 an agent (say i) is drawn at random from I. With probability 1 ¡ µ 2 (0; 1] she is allowed to update her current strategy s it only (given r it ), while with probability µ 2 (0; 1] she can simultaneously update both s it and r it 8 .
7 Strictly speaking, the regime of network externalities (positive vs. negative) is not equivalent to strict monotonocity (increasing or decreasing) of net payo¤s with respect to neighborhood size. Since agents do not directly select their partners, a higher r might indeed entail a non-increasing number of coordinated agents. 8 All results presented in the next Sections are not qualitatively altered if one instead assumes that, Consider …rst strategy updating only. We assume that agent i best-responds (without mistakes) to the current local con…guration. Thus:
We also suppose that agents are change-averse, i.e. they stick to their current choice when ties occur. On the contrary, an agent drawn to update both s it and r it will only be able to locally adjust her neighborhood radius and her current strategy. More formally, we suppose that given (r it ; s it ), agent i will only have (for both s = s it and s = ¡s it ) the following three options: (i) shrinking to r it ¡1; (ii) keeping r it ; or (iii) enlarging to r it +1: Agents myopically choose the best-response among their available options, i.e.:
s:t: s 2 f¡1; 1g r 2 R(N ) : jr ¡ r it j · 1 :
As happens in action updating, we suppose that players are change-averse. Furthermore, we assume for the sake of simplicity that, whenever (s; r i;t + 1) and (s; r i;t ¡ 1) are the unique solutions of (6) for s 2 f¡1; 1g, agents always choose (s; r i;t ¡ 1) 9 :
Given any initial conditions 0 2 ¡(N); eqs. (2), (4), (5) and (6) de…ne a Markov chain f t ; t¸1g with …nite state-space ¡(N).
In the following section, we will characterize the set of steady states of the dynamic process (i.e. absorbing states of the Markov chain). We will show that this set is non empty and that the system almost always converges to a steady state in …nite time. Moreover, we will characterize steady-states in terms of aggregate coordination and neighborhood structures. We will show that both full coordination and coexistence of conventions can arise in a SS. Furthermore, we will provide examples of SS in which coexistence of conventions arises together with heterogenous neighborhood structures. in each period t; an agent currently playing (s i;t ; r i;t ) is allowed with probability µ 2 (0; 1) to revise only her current neighborhood size given the current strategy con…guration (i.e. she is not allowed to change strategy and radius at the same time).
9 This assumption does not crucially a¤ect the dynamic properties of the system. In fact, one might equally employ the alternative assumption (i.e. always choose (s; r i;t + 1)) without loss of generality. Moreover, as shown in Appendix A, this tie-break case can only arise if unit cost°lies in a non-dense subset of R + (i.e. for residual choices of°). In what follows, we will not employ randomization (i.e. choose with equal probability between (s; r i;t ¡ 1) and (s; r i;t + 1)) to simplify the analysis of convergence (cf. Prop. 2 below). 
is stable with respect to neighborhood updating, it will be also stable for strategy updating. Hence, it su¢ces to impose the condition (s i;t+1 ; r i;t+1 ) = (s (at least) both con…gurations 1 = (1; 1) i2I and ¡1 = (¡1; 1) i2I : Indeed, if all agents choose the same strategy then x i (1) 2 f0; 1g for all i. Hence, as it can be easily seen by replacing x i;r ¤ i with either 0 or 1 in SS conditions, no agent has an incentive to enlarge her current radius.
In Proposition 2, we show that in the long run the process f t ; t¸1g will almost always converge in …nite time to a point of ¡ ¤ (°; N) for all (µ;°; N). To see why, notice that in each time period one and only one agent can update her current state by best-replying to local strategies pro…les. Moreover, tie-breaking rules de…ned in Section 3 imply that individual best-replies are unique given the current con…guration. Hence, the resulting best-reply strategy revision process governing the evolution of con…gurations is characterized by the so-called 'unique best-reply property' (see Blume (1995) ). For such class of Markov processes, we know that there is a one-to-one correspondence between absorbing states and ergodic sets (i.e. all con…gurations which are not SS are transient). Hence, …nite-time convergence to an absorbing state is a probability one event in our system.
Proposition 2 (Convergence to SS) For any given N¸5; µ 2 (0; 1];°> 0 and 0 2 ¡(N ), the process f t ; t¸1g de…ned by eqs. (2), (4), (5) and (6) will almost always converge in …nite time to an absorbing state
Proof. See Appendix A.
As typically happens in best-response strategy revision games without trembles, the set ¡ ¤ (°; N ) is likely to contain many other absorbing states apart from the ones characterized by full coordination con…gurations with minimal neighborhood size. In Proposition 3, we start characterizing the set of SS. In particular we ask whether (and in which parameters region) the system is able to sustain SS involving high vs. low levels of coordination, together with homogeneous vs. heterogeneous neighborhood structures.
Proposition 3 Consider a SS
1. For any (°; N); there exist SS in which b s 2 f¡1; 1g, i.e. full coordination arises. Such SS necessarily imply r 4. There exist parameter values (°; N ) such that in a SS coexistence of conventions and heterogeneous neighborhood sizes is possible. More precisely, heterogeneous strategy con…gurations can sustain heterogeneous neighborhood sizes (for a given population size) only if°·
The main …nding is that both full and partial coordination can in principle arise as a SS.
However, unlike what happens in Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001) , Jackson & Watts (2000) and Droste et al. (2000) , negative network externalities prevents any network di¤erent from the minimally connected one (and thus also the complete one) to sustain full coordination in a SS, no matter how small unit costs are. This is because full coordination implies that every agent gets the highest possible gross payo¤ irrespective of her neighborhood size, so that enlarging the neighborhood necessarily leads to smaller payo¤s.
Conversely, strategy con…gurations characterized by low coordination can arise together with both homogeneous (with radius 1) and heterogeneous interaction structures. As illustrated in the following example, the same heterogeneous strategy con…guration can in principle sustain (for su¢ciently small°) many alternative interaction structures entailing di¤erent aggregate interaction costs for the society.
Example 4 Suppose that N = 11 (i.e. e r = 5) and that the following strategy con…guration is given: Notice that in the example the …rst con…guration is homogenous and allows the system to reach the lowest aggregate neighborhood cost (N°), while the second one is heterogeneous and ine¢cient, because aggregate neighborhood cost is strictly larger than N°.
Yet, a heterogeneous strategy con…guration can sustain a homogeneous neighborhood structure only if neighborhood size is the minimal one. This is because the larger neighborhood sizes held by two adjacent agents who play opposite strategies, the larger the number of common neighbors playing +1 who are needed in order for that con…guration to be locally stable with respect to strategy updating (see App. C). This prevents sustainability of interaction structures with higher neighborhood sizes (e.g. with r > 1 all i).
Furthermore, heterogeneous strategy con…gurations cannot sustain heterogeneous radii for all parameter values (°; N): As local network externalities become eventually negative when neighborhood sizes increase for a given N , any agent holding a r¡neighborhood faces stronger negative network externalities e¤ects as°increases given r; or, equivalently, as r increases given°. In the extreme case, it is possible to show (see App. B) that if°( r ¡ 1) > Therefore, heterogeneous strategy con…gurations can sustain heterogeneous radii only if°is su¢ciently small for a given population size. In such situations agents trade-o¤ between positive and negative network externalities. On the one hand, players try to adjust strategy and neighborhood so as to increase gross payo¤s given their local environment. If network externalities are perceived to be positive even at large distances (e.g. strategy con…guration is su¢ciently heterogeneous), some agents have the incentive to enlarge their information 'window' up to values close to e r. On the other hand, as°increases for given N, negative network externalities tend to dominate even for small neighborhood sizes. In such a situation, agents always shrink their radius while simultaneously switching strategies up to the point at which all agents will hold r = 1.
So far, we attempted to provide a characterization of the SS of the system as far as heterogeneity vs. homogeneity of strategies and neighborhood structures are concerned. In the next Section, we will turn to Montecarlo (MC) computer-simulations exercises to shed light on the long-run behavior of the system. In particular, we will explore how system parameters a¤ect long-run coordination and interaction structures.
5 The Long-Run Behavior of the System: Simulation
Results
Let M be the number of realizations of the stochastic process f t ; t¸1g generated from a sample of random, independently drawn, initial conditions f 0;m 2 ¡; m = 1; :::; M g. Since for any choice of (°; µ; N ) convergence to a SS
is a probability-one event in each run m, we can study the long-run behavior of the system by analyzing MC distributions of some interesting statistics computed on 
In the following, we will explore how long-run coordination and neighborhood patterns depend on system parameters by focusing on how (b c; b
r mć hange with (N;°; µ) 10 .
Coordination and Neighborhood Formation
A …rst clear-cut result that MC simulations point out is that, for any (N;°; µ); the likelihood of absorption in SS characterized by high average coordination and small average 10 The MC sample size M is usually chosen between 1000 and 10000. In general, this range is su¢cient both to attain a good precision of the estimates (e.g. extremely low MC variances ¾ 2 (c m ) and ¾ 2 (r m )) and, at the same time, to keep the probability of duplications in drawing initial con…gurations below 0.5%, even for small N. Since MC variances do not change very much across the parameter space, we can neglect the study of coe¢cients c m =¾ 2 (c m ) and r m =¾ 2 (r m ) and focus on MC means only.
neighborhood sizes is very large. More precisely:
Observation 1: In 84.6% of runs, the society is absorbed in SS characterized by average coordination levels c m¸0 :9. Moreover, in 89.6% of cases the system is absorbed either by 1 = (1; 1) i2I or 1 = (¡1; 1) i2I , while in 99.1% of runs the scaled average radius R m = e r ¡1 r m 2 (0; 1] is smaller than 0.50.
Despite the presence of negative local network externalities, the society seems therefore able to exploit neighborhood adjustment to reach con…gurations that are globally characterized by high levels of coordination. Nevertheless, as one starts exploring the long-run behavior of the system as (°; µ) vary in the relevant parameter space for a given population size N , it appears that the system may be trapped, with a small but signi…cant likelihood, in long-run con…gurations with low average coordination. In Figs. 1a and 1b, we depict an example of how b c and b r change with (°; µ) for N = 21. Aggregate coordination, as measured by b c; attains values close to 70% when both°and µ are large. In the same region of the parameter space, the frequency of MC simulations in which the system is absorbed either by ¤ +1 or by ¤ ¡1 is around 50%. Conversely, average neighborhood sizes, while staying very close to 1 for almost all sampled°'s and µ's, seem to decrease with unit costs and, at least when the latter are small, to weakly increase with the frequency of neighborhood adjustment. In general, the evidence about how°and µ a¤ect coordination and interaction structures for any given N can be summarized in the following observations.
Observation 2: For all N > 4, average coordination b c is always non-increasing in°and µ. In particular, the frequency of all runs in which c m > 0:95 is 0.48 when°¸0:5 and 0.74 when°< 0:5. Moreover, the frequency of all runs in which c m > 0:95 is 0.54 when µ¸0:1 and 0.77 when µ < 0:1.
Observation 3: For all N > 4, average neighborhood sizes b r is always non-increasing in°a nd non-decreasing in µ. In particular, the frequency of all runs in which r m > 1 is 0.077 when°¸0:5 and 0.066 when°< 0:5. Moreover, the frequency of all runs in which r m > 1 is 0.088 when µ¸0:1 and 0.065 when µ < 0:1: Therefore, smaller unit costs imply higher average neighborhood sizes together with higher aggregate coordination, while a lower speed of neighborhood adjustment induces higher aggregate coordination. Figs. (2a-2d) plot the typical time evolution of c m and R m in four setups characterized by small (resp. large) unit costs and small (resp. large) speed of neighborhood adjustment. Recall that given N, a larger°implies stronger negative externalities network e¤ects (even locally), and possibly agents willing to shrink their neighborhoods no matter strategy con…gurations. Conversely, a small°induces larger ‡exibility in local payo¤ improvements through the exploitation of positive local network externalities. Moreover, a small speed of neighborhood updating allows players to better coordinate with their neighbors given the current interaction structure, especially when the latter is characterized by large neighborhoods (as typically happens at the beginning of the realizations).
Hence, when°is very small, agents are expected to employ neighborhood updating to locally coordinate with each other. This would in turn lead to an initial increase of c m in response of ‡uctuations in r m . However, whether full aggregate coordination will be attained or not depends on the magnitude of µ: If µ is small (cf. Fig. 2a) , agents are able to fully exploit their currently large neighborhoods to better coordinate. Thus c m quickly converges to 1 and, from then on, r m slowly decreases toward 1 (i.e. R m tends to e r ¡1 ). Conversely, when µ is large, the society can sometimes be trapped in a low coordination con…guration that sustains higher average neighborhood sizes (see Fig.  2b ). On the contrary, if°is very large, negative network externalities induce agents to minimize costs by shrinking neighborhood sizes irrespective of gross payo¤s. Hence, r m steadily decreases from the beginning of the process. This introduces turbulence in strategy con…gurations and makes harder to reach full coordination, because agents always switch their strategies while shrinking (see App. B). Once again, whether full or partial coordination will be achieved strongly depends on the speed of neighborhood adjustment. In general, the smaller µ, the quicker the system will converge to c m = 1 (see Figs. 2c and  2d) . Here, however, SS con…gurations with r m > 1 will be hardly reached, because°is too large to sustain neighborhood radii larger than 1. Let us now turn to explore the e¤ects of increasing the population size N for given (°; µ). The following observations summarize the results stemming from MC experiments.
Observation 4: If the initial neighborhood structure is drawn at random from R(N ) = f1; 2; :::; e rg, then for all N > 4: Observation 5: If R(N ) = R = f1; 2; :::; e Rg; where e R is a constant, then average coordination b c tend to fall with population size for any (°; µ) and e R. If e R · 3; average coordination b c is grater than 0:75 in 88% of simulations when N · 11, while, for all N > 11, b c is grater than 0:75 in only 5% of runs.
The foregoing results are not surprising if we recall that a larger population size implies a larger average for the distribution of initial neighborhood sizes, as e r = bN=2c. This has two e¤ects. First, for any given°(and if we consider wlog N odd), there exists a threshold r ¤ (°) = (1+2°)=2°, independent of N, such that any agent holding neighborhoods with r > r ¤ (°) will always shrink to r¡1 irrespective of local frequencies. Therefore, as N grows, the range of attainable radii increases and thus negative network externalities are more likely. Second, as discussed in App. C, heterogeneous SS strategy con…gurations tend to be less and less sustainable as the average neighborhood size increases (no matter if µ > 0 or not). Consequently, full coordination will be almost always the case for very large population sizes when e r = bN=2c, as individuals can take advantage of larger overlaps in initial neighborhood structure. In such situation, the network of links channelling information among players is initially more connected. This speeds up individual learning and favors more coordinated con…gurations (cf. Fig. 3a) .
On the contrary, when the ratio between the upper bound of the support of the initial radius distribution and the population size (e.g. e R=N ) decreases with N , players are not able to fully exploit neighborhood learning to better coordinate. Therefore, heterogeneous strategy con…gurations are more easily attainable (cf. Fig. 3b) .
Finally, notice that if R(N) = f1; 2; :::; e rg; the relationship between population size and average neighborhood sizes b r depends on the trade-o¤ between the expected increase in b r (due to a larger e r) and the strength of negative local network externalities. Hence, the smaller°, the easier an increase of b r for small population sizes. However, when N becomes su¢ciently large, negative network externalities tend to o¤set any increase in average neighborhood size: Thus, b r will eventually fall and its maximum (as well as is maximand) will typically decrease with°(see Fig. 3c ). As a result, the re-scaled average radius b R will always be non-increasing in population size.
Static vs. Evolving Interaction Structures
In the foregoing analysis, we have analyzed the average long-run behavior of the model when players can learn how to select their partners in order to locally coordinate with them. Despite the presence of negative network externalities, the system seems able to reach very high (although not necessarily full) coordination even in small societies. This is in particular true whenever: (i) the frequency at which players can simultaneously adjust strategy and neighbors is positive and small; (ii) neighborhood costs are small. In this section we will address the issue of how average coordination levels attained by a system with positive probability of neighborhood updating (denoted by b c µ>0 ) compares with those reached by a system in which interaction structures are static (i.e. b c µ=0 ).
As a benchmark case, let us start by assuming that initial interaction structures are homogenous among agents. Notice that when µ = 0; the neighborhood structure is exactly the same studied in the existing literature on local coordination games (cf. e.g. Ellison (1993) ). On the contrary, when µ > 0 we will allow agents to adjust strategies and radii starting from an initial interaction structure where all agents hold the same neighborhood size. In this case, the main results are the following.
Observation 6: Suppose that, for µ¸0; the initial radius con…guration is homogeneous, i.e. r i0 = r all i 2 I; r = 1; 2; :::; e r. Then:
1. Average coordination with static neighborhoods is increasing in r = 1; 2; :::; e r for any N and converges to 1 as r ! e r. Speci…cally, if (e r ¡1 r) < 0:9; b c µ=0 is lower than 0:5 in 99% of runs: On the contrary, when (e r ¡1 r) < 0:9, b c µ>0 (i.e. average coordination with evolving networks) is greater than 0.73 in 99% of runs.
2. For any choice of r = 1; 2; :::; e r such that the scaled radius e r ¡1 r goes to zero as N ! 1, b c µ=0 is decreasing in N and converges to 0 as N ! 1. For the same parametrizations, a system with µ > 0 attains a SS average coordination level b c µ>0 which is greater than b c µ=0 in 95% of runs.
Therefore, a positive probability of neighborhood adjustment favors higher coordination levels, as compared to those attained with static homogeneous structures. In fact, as r tends to e r for a given N and agents cannot adjust neighborhoods, the communication network tends to the complete one and thus b c µ=0 increases. As Fig. 4a shows for the case N = 11; b c µ=0 is very small when r ' 1 and monotonically converges to 1. Nevertheless, coordination levels attained in a system with the same homogeneous initial radius con…guration and a positive rate of neighborhood adjustment are higher than those attained for µ = 0; for a wide range of system parameters.
Moreover, b c µ=0 typically falls as N increases when neighborhood radius is su¢ciently small with respect to N , as the constraints induced on local frequencies by heterogeneous strategy con…gurations are increasingly less sustainable at a global level (see Fig. 4b for an illustration). If we allow for neighborhood adjustment (µ > 0) and we force initial neighborhood radii to be homogeneous, average coordination always ends up to be larger than b c µ=0 . Once again, the combined e¤ects of endogenous neighborhood formation and negative local network externalities sustain better long-run coordination patterns through the exploitation of favorable local improvements.
Finally, notice that similar results can be obtained when we assume heterogeneous initial interaction structures fr i0 ; i 2 Ig (i.e. where 9 i 2 I and j 2 I, j 6 = i such that r i0 6 = r j0 ) for µ¸0. Hence, if players can respond to their local environment by simultaneously adjusting both strategies and partners, the society seems able to attain better long-run average coordination patterns than in the case where interaction structures are static.
Beyond the Basic Setup: Some Preliminary Exercises
In the foregoing Sections we have analyzed the dynamic properties of a quite simple coordination game played by a population of spatially-located, myopic, agents who can repeatedly update both the action to play in the game and the size of their interaction neighborhood. We have deliberately restricted our attention to a simple dynamic population game where: (i) agents are located on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries; (ii) the underlying stage-game is a pure-coordination one; (iii) network externalities are locally positive but globally negative (i.e. ® = 1 in Eq. (3)). In this Section, we will try to provide some intuitions about the behavior of the system when one gradually departs from these assumptions.
Positive vs. Negative Network Externalities
To begin with, suppose that in Eq. (3) ® = 0: In this case, an agent i holding a radius r it earns a net payo¤:
Notice …rst that if¯¸1 net payo¤s are always less (or equal) than zero for all x i (r it ). Network externalities are always negative and agents will prefer to hold the smallest radius as possible (r = 1). Suppose instead that¯< 1. It is easy to see 11 that if¯< 1 4 an agent will amost always enlarge her radius. For unit costs in this range, net payo¤s are strictly increasing in the size of the network (i.e. the number of agents in the neighborhood playing +1) for almost all local con…gurations. Finally, if 1 4 ·¯< 1; the regime of network externalities is mixed because neighborhood updating strongly depends on local frequencies.
By developing an argument similar to that in Proposition 3 (cf. Appendix A), one can easily characterize the SS of the process. On the one hand, it is possible to show that in a SS full coordination (i.e. s ¤ i = +1 all i or s ¤ i = +1 all i) can sustain, for any (N; µ); only one of two alternative neighborhood structures: (i) the minimally connected one, i.e. fr ¤ i = 1; i 2 Ig, when¯> 1; or (ii) the complete network one, i.e. fr ¤ i = e r; i 2 Ig, when < 1: Therefore, coexistence of conventions cannot emerge neither with heterogeneous neighborhood structures, nor with homogeneous ones where r ¤ i = r, all i; but r 6 = 1; e r. On the other hand, heterogeneous strategy con…gurations can sustain both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. More importantly, the condition¯< 1 is necessary but not su¢cient for the emergence of complete networks: when 1 4 ·¯< 1 there might exist many SS where coexistence of conventions and heterogeneous neighborhood structures coexist. In addition, as happens when ® = 1; the complete network (as well as any other homogeneous network with r > 1) cannot be sustained in a SS by a strategy con…guration characterized by coexistence of conventions (i.e. c < 1) 12 .
Figs. 5a and 5b plot, for the case N = 21; average coordination and neighborhood radius as (¯; µ) change. As expected, the long run behavior of the system is strongly a¤ected by the level of unit cost. When¯< , full coordination together with complete networks always arise. However, when 1 4 ·¯< 1, the mixed network externalities regime allows agents to trade-o¤ between larger neighborhoods and higher coordination. Despite complete networks and full coordination are still very likely to emerge, the system may be dynamically trapped in partial coordination con…gurations where some agents hold small neighborhoods. This results contrasts with …ndings in Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001) and is due both to the assumption of indirect partner selection and to the constraints imposed by the underlying geography. Finally, if network externalities are 'always negative' (¯> 1), average neighborhood sizes shrink very fast toward 1. As¯grows, the only stable neighborhood structure becomes indeed the minimal one (i.e. r m = 1) for which we know there are many stable, heterogeneous, strategy con…gurations. Nevertheless, average coordination does not decrease dramatically: for all N¸11;°= 2¯· 1:5 and µ 2 (0; 1], c m > 0:90 in 93.75% of all runs, as compared to 84.60% when ® = 0, cf. Obs. 1. The parameter ® may be then interpreted as governing the network externality regime in the economy: for a given parameter setup (N;¯; µ), the higher ® the more network externalities induce agents to penalize larger neighborhood sizes. When one studies how average coordination and average neighborhood sizes vary when ® smoothly changes in [0; 1], it is worth noting that, when¯is small, a system with ® = 1 is able to reach coordination levels which are as high as the ones attained by any system with ® < 1. However, as soon as ® becomes less than 1; almost full coordination is reached because the complete network becomes stable and viable. On the contrary, systems with ® = 1 attain high coordination together with very small neighborhood sizes and thus higher average net payo¤s 13 . 12 The proof of this statement is analogous to that developed in Appendix A for the case ® = 1. Notice also that when¯= 1 and full coordination applies, any neighborhood structure is stable because all payo¤s are equal to zero. 13 For instance, when N = 11;¯=°2 = 10 ¡6 and µ = 1; any system with ® < 1 is able to reach full coordination in a complete network in almost 100% of runs. On the contrary, when ® = 1 the analysis in the foregoing Sections shows that b c ' 0:945 and b R = 0:205:
Higher-Dimensional Lattices, Neighborhood Speci…cation and Coordination
In the basic setup agents were placed in a 1-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries (i.e. a circle). In this subsection we test whether (and in which ways) the behavior of the system is a¤ected by this particular choice for the topology of interactions. In particular, we explore what happens to average coordination when: (a) agents are located in À-dimensional lattices, À¸2; and (b) we allow for notions of 'distance' between agents di¤erent from the Manhattan metrics (d 1 ). Let us start by assuming that each agent is associated to a node of a À-dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries. In this case, agent i 2 I has coordinates (x i1 ; :::; x iÀ ). If the relevant metrics is still d 1 , then the neighborhood of agent i is de…ned as:
where r it 2 f1; 2; :::; e rg and e r = bN 1 À c. It is easy to show that the size of a generic r¡neighborhood in À dimensions reads:
Hence, for a given À; jV À (r)j grows as r À (and symmetrically, for a given r, as À r ).
Suppose that payo¤s are still de…ned as in Eq. (3) and that ® = 1 (i.e. we are in the standard case where the regime of network externalities allows for 'locally' positive but eventually 'negative' spillovers). Table 1 reports the results of some MC exercises for 2 and 3-dimensional lattices, when (µ;¯) belong to benchmark parametrizations. Since e r depends on both N and À, we study how average coordination and average neighborhood radius change when À = 1; 2; 3 and either e r or N are kept …xed. As Table 1 shows, in both setups with À = 2 and À = 3, average coordination is increasing with¯and µ, while average radius is decreasing in¯: Thus, the relationship between unit cost and frequency of neighborhood updating, on the one hand, and coordination and neighborhood size, on the other, is robust to changes in À. However, higher-dimensional lattices generally imply lower coordination. Furthermore, average neighborhood radius does not seem to be very much a¤ected by À. The same pattern arises no matter one keeps constant the maximum attainable radius e r (so that N increases with À) or the population size N (so that e r decreases with À). Finally, as exempli…ed by the 2-dimensional case, a larger population size implies lower coordination as soon as À > 1:
This evidence is not surprising if one notices that, as the dimension of the lattice increases: (i) negative network externalities are more likely for a given¯(because gross payo¤s are still bounded from above by 1, while neighborhood costs grow as r À ); (ii) the number of strategy con…gurations which are locally sustainable when all agents hold a radius r = 1 increases (cf. Blume (1993) ). Therefore, agents prefer to hold a radius r = 1 even when À > 1 because of stronger NNE. At that point, the system is more likely to be trapped in a stable strategy con…guration characterized by lower coordination. Furthermore, the number of neighbors that two adjacent agents have in common decreases with À (if the size of the neighborhood remains constant). Hence, as the population size increases, the degree of anonymity in the lattice increases (cf. Berninghaus & Schwalbe (1996) ). In turn, this implies that the constraints imposed by the geography of interactions on stable strategy con…guration are no longer stringent as in the 1-dimensional case (cf. App. C). Thus, low coordination con…gurations are still reachable even when N grows.
Finally, when À¸2 the metrics with which we endow the space where agents are located does a¤ect long-run patterns of coordination. Suppose for example that the distance between two agents i and j is de…ned as: A neighborhood with radius r will then have a hypercubic shape (i.e. a Moore's neighborhood) instead of a hyperspheric shape (i.e. a Von Neumann's neighborhood) 14 . This new geography of interactions usually entails higher coordination levels, as compared to the standard case where neighborhoods are de…ned employing the Manhattan metrics. Indeed, when N is kept …xed as À = 2; 3, the society achieves almost full coordination in all parametrizations (i.e. c m > 0:99 in 95% of all runs).
Pareto-E¢cient vs. Risk-Dominant Nash Equilibria
The simple model presented in Section 3 may be easily employed to address the issue of convergence to Pareto-e¢cient (PE) vs. risk-dominant (RD) equilibria. Suppose indeed that agents play generic coordination games (instead of pure coordination ones). In this case, if agent i plays s i 2 f¡1; 1g when agent j 0 s strategy is s j 2 f¡1; 1g; her stage-game 14 The size of a r-radius Moore's neighborhood in À dimensions is thus (2r + 1) À ¡ 1; which of course is larger than the size of a Von Neumann's neighborhood. Moreover, two adjacent agents holding rMoore's neighborhoods have more neighbors in common than two adjacent agents with r-Von Neumann's neighborhoods. payo¤ is given by:
where a > c; b < d and a > d (i.e. the Nash equilibrium (+1; +1) is Pareto e¢cient). Recent studies have pointed out that Pareto e¢ciency might not generally be the relevant selection principle whenever the other Nash equilibrium (i.e. (¡1; ¡1) ) is risk-dominant, i.e. if c + d > a + b. More speci…cally, Kandori et al. (1993) , Ellison (1993) , Young (1996) and Blume (1993) have shown that, whenever agents repeatedly interact (either locally or globally) with the same set of partners and employ best-reply rules with trembles, the unique long-run outcome is the establishment of the risk-dominant convention (all play ¡1). Convergence to the PE convention (all play +1) is however restored when players are spatially located but they can indirectly select their partners by moving across locations (cf. Ely (1996) , Oechssler (1997) and Dieckemann (1999) ). In general, Pareto e¢ciency is typically the case whenever agents have some ‡exibility in selecting their partners and they are able to 'isolate' themselves within islands of coordination (see e.g. Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001, p. 8) ). However, when interaction structures are made endogenous, e¢ciency results strongly depend on the details of network evolution. For instance, when unit link costs are small enough, Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001) …nd that the system almost surely converges to the RD outcome, while in Jackson & Watts (2000) the con…guration where all agents play ¡1 is not the unique (evolutionary) stable state.
To explore e¢ciency issues in the present model, we considered the basic setup where À = 1 and ® = 1 and we let for the sake of simplicity a = 2, b = 0, d = 1 and c 2 [0; 2): Notice that if c 2 [0; 1) the PE Nash equilibrium is also RD, while if c 2 (1; 2) the NE (¡1; ¡1) is RD. Finally, if c = 1 the two pure-strategy equilibria are risk-equivalent. Table  2 shows for N = 51 and some benchmark parametrization for (¯; µ) MC means of the average strategy (s m ) and average radius (r m ), as c = 0:00; 1:00; 1:99.
Across all parametrizations, the system displays a clear tendency toward the riskdominant equilibrium. In contrast with existing results, the regime of network externalities studied here restores convergence to the RD outcome even when unit costs are large enough. In fact, when the RD equilibrium is unique (i.e. c = 0 and c = 1:99), the system converges to homogeneous con…gurations when all agents play the RD strategy (and also PE only when c = 0). Notice however that when both equilibria are risk-equivalent, 50% of agents play the PE equilibrium and this frequency increases when unit costs are small and the frequency of neighborhood updating is large. In these cases, players enjoy larger neighborhoods and are able to better coordinate on the PE equilibrium.
Conclusions
The details of the process governing the coevolution of expectations formation, individual choices and interaction structure might strongly a¤ect the long-run outcome of a coordination game repeatedly played in large populations.
To investigate this issue, we have presented a model in which myopic, spatially located individuals play a pure coordination game with their nearest neighbors. Key features of the models are, …rst, that agents are allowed, in each period, to adjust both current stagegame strategies and neighborhood size with an exogenously given probability. Since this probability can be treated as a system parameter, one can address the question whether a higher frequency of endogenous neighborhood formation entails higher aggregate coordination. Second, neighborhood formation is itself a local interaction process, because any agent can only enlarge or shrink by one unit her interaction radius. Finally, we analyze a system characterized by local network externalities which might be positive when the neighborhood size is relatively small, but they eventually become negative when the latter becomes too large.
We show that the system almost always converges to a set of absorbing states in which full coordination, as well as coexistence of conventions, are both possible. However, if full coordination arises, all players must hold the smallest as possible neighborhood. On the contrary, long-run coexistence of conventions can arise together with many, possibly heterogeneous, neighborhood structures. Nevertheless, computer simulations show that the system is able to reach very large average coordination levels, together with small average neighborhood sizes, for almost all parametrizations. We also …nd that the rate of neighborhood updating negatively a¤ects average coordination levels. This raises the question of how coordination levels with endogenous neighborhoods compare to the case in which interaction structures are static. Simulations indicate that, for a large class of exogenously given interaction structures and system parameters, a population with a small but positive rate of endogenous neighborhood formation always reaches higher coordination. In addition, we …nd that large societies perform better than small ones provided that individuals initially hold, on average, large neighborhoods.
Finally, we explore the behavior of the model when one gradually departs from the basic setup by assuming that: (i) network externalities might be positive for all neighborhood sizes; (ii) agents are located in lattices with dimension higher than one; and (iii) agents play generic coordination stage-games where a trade-o¤ arises between Pareto-e¢cient and risk-dominant Nash equilibria.
More generally, the robustness of the foregoing results should be checked with respect to a number of key assumptions. First, one might study the e¤ects of introducing individual decision rules di¤erent from deterministic best-reply (e.g. best-reply with mistakes, log-linear decision rules, etc.). Along the same lines, the consequences of assuming alternative tie-breaking rules and updating schemes should be thoroughly analyzed. For example, one could experiment with agents who always randomize when ties occur. In addition, one might explore the dynamic properties of the system in presence of a synchronous -or an incentive-based -updating scheme governing how many agents (and who) are allowed to update their state in each period (cf. Page (1997) ). Second, introducing non-linear neighborhood cost functions, as well as gross payo¤s from coordination which themselves depend on the distance between agents, might allow a deeper understanding of the trade-o¤ between negative and positive network externalities.
Appendices

A Proofs
Proof of Prop. 2 Consider (wlog) individual updating rules when µ = 1: Given the current strategy pro…le, the agent drawn to update her current state (s; r) faces the following relevant payo¤ matrix:
If given local frequency pro…le (x i;r¡1 ; x i;r ; x i;r+1 ) no ties occur, then best-replies are unique. If, on the contrary, some ties occur, rede…ne the payo¤ matrix by adding some " > 0 to the entry associated to the choice preferred under the relevant tie-breaking rule (see Section (3)). Once again, the resulting embedded game is such that, for any given strategy con…guration, there is a unique best-response (s ¤ ; r ¤ ) for any individual facing updating. Therefore, for any given N¸5; µ 2 (0; 1];°> 0 and 0 2 ¡(N ), the Markov chain governing the evolution of the process f t ; t¸1g has the so-called 'unique best-reply property' (see Blume (1995) ). For such Markov processes, we know that there is a one-to-one correspondence between absorbing states and ergodic sets. Hence, …nite-time convergence to an absorbing state is a probability one event in our system. Finally, notice that the tiebreaking assumption concerning the case when (s; r i;t + 1) and (s; r i;t ¡ 1) are the unique solutions of (6) for s 2 f¡1; 1g (i.e. always choose (s; r i;t ¡ 1)), is not very restrictive. Indeed, let h = 0; 1; :::; 2(r ¡ 1) the number of agents playing +1 in V r¡1 and k r = 0; 1; 2 the number of agents playing +1 in the set V i;r nV i;r¡1 : It is easy to show that a tie occurs (when s = +1), i.e.:
x r¡1 ¡°(r ¡ 1) = x r+1 ¡°(r + 1) > x r ¡°r i¤ h¸r ¡ k r and:°=
Numerical experiments show that the set of all°satisfying these conditions has cardinality that grows as N 2 : Hence, if°lies in a dense subset of R + , the considered tie-breaking rule is not relevant and the embedded game has the unique best-reply property anyway.¥
Proof of Prop. 3
Proof of Point 1. We need to show that: (i) the con…guration f(s i ; r i ) = (+1; 1); all i 2 Ig is a SS; and that (ii) given that all agents play s i = +1 only r i = 1 all i can be a SS. Notice that payo¤ symmetry with respect to strategies allows us to avoid treating the case s i = ¡1, all i: Moreover, as SS conditions for strategy updating are contained in SS conditions for neighborhood updating, it su¢ces to check the latter. When all s i = +1; then x i (r) = 1 8r = 1; :::; e r: Hence, for r = 2; :::; e r ¡ 1; generic payo¤ matrices read:
r ¡ 1 r r + 1 s = +1 1 ¡°(r ¡ 1) 1 ¡°r 1 ¡°(r + 1) s = ¡1 ¡°(r ¡ 1) ¡°r ¡°(r + 1)
:
As 1 ¡°r¸¡°r for any r the strategy con…guration s i = +1; all i, is stable for any r. However, as payo¤s are decreasing in r, any agent will shrink until r i = 1; all i. ¥ Proof of Point 2. Consider wlog N > 3 odd. Let us start by observing that there are no SS action con…gurations where exactly 1 or N ¡ 1 agents choose +1 (or symmetrically ¡1). Indeed, suppose s 1 = ¡1, s i = +1 for i = 2; :::; N: Then x 1 (r) = 1 for any r. Hence, even if all remaining strategies and radii are stable (e.g. because all r i = 1; i¸2), agent 1 will always switch. As a result, if strategy heterogeneity is the case, then b s 6 = f¡ g is a SS. To see why, consider agents playing +1 (a symmetric argument holds for agents playing ¡1). SS conditions can be rewritten as follows:°¸maxf1 ¡ x 1 ¡ x 2 ; x 2 ¡ x 1 g. As far as local frequencies x 1 and x 2 are concerned, there can be at most three types of agents, namely: (i) (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (1; 1); (ii) (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (1; ): In all such cases, the SS condition above reads°¸0, which is always true.
Proof of Point 3. We need to show that for any fs i ; i 2 Ig s.t. jb sj 6 = 1;homogenous radius con…gurations are only possible if all agents choose r i = r = 1: First, notice that r i = e r, all i cannot be a SS. If it were, then it must be that for all i, x i (e r)¸1 2 if s
¤ be the global frequency of agents playing +1, then
. By heterogeneity, the two inequalities should be satis…ed simultaneously, which gives a contradiction.
Second, any con…guration in which r i = 2; :::; e r ¡ 1; all i; cannot be a SS either. If it were, SS conditions would jointly imply (cf. Lemma 1) that
However, if a heterogeneous con…guration is to be stable, any two adjacent agents, say i and i+1; such that s ¤ i = +1 and s ¤ i+1 = ¡1 must be locally stable. As both holds a r¡radius neighborhood, then V i;r = fi¡r; i¡r+1; :::; i¡1; i+1; i+2; :::; i+rg and V i+1;r = fi ¡ r +1; :::; i ¡ 1; i; i +2; :::; i + r; i + r +1g: Hence V i;r \ V i+1;r = fi ¡ r + 1; :::; i ¡ 1; i + 2; :::; i + rg. Let us call x c the frequency of agents playing +1 in V i;r \ V i+1;r whose size is 2(r ¡ 1). Then, since s ¤ i = +1 and s ¤ i+1 = ¡1:
where 1 (s j =+1) = 1 if s j = +1 and 0 otherwise. By the inequality above, we must have that:
Proof of Point 4. To show point 4, we will provide examples supporting the statement that, depending on (°; N ); there exist SS sustaining heterogeneous neighborhood sizes with some agents choosing r ¤ i = 1 and some other agents choosing r ¤ i 2 f2; :::; e r ¡ 1; e rg: To show that a given strategy-radius con…guration is a SS, one should check if, for any agent, SS inequalities are satis…ed. In the following Lemma, we will present an easier way to check for local SS conditions. Indeed, for an individual state (s i ; r i ) to be stable, only the number of agents playing +1 in V i (r ¡ 1); as well as the 4 agents playing +1 in V i (r) \ V i (r ¡ 1) and in V i (r + 1) \ V i (r); matter.
Lemma 5 (Characterization of Local SS Conditions) Assume (wlog) that s i = +1 (symmetric results hold for s = ¡1). Let V r =V r¡1 = fj 2 I : j 2 V r ; j = 2 V r¡1 g: Then:
1. Suppose that r i = 1: Let h = 0; 1; 2 the number of agents i playing +1 in V 2 and k = 0; 1; 2 the number of agents i playing +1 in V 2 =V 1 : Then r = 1 is locally stable for agent i if and only if h = 1; 2 (i.e. h 6 = 1), k 2 f0; 1; 2g and°satisfy the following conditions:
Illustrations of local strategy con…gurations consistent with correspondent values of (h; k) are also shown. Notice that also con…gurations obtained from the ones reported by simply switching neighbors symmetrically are SS.
2. Suppose that r i = e r: Let h = 0; 1; :::; 2(e r¡1) the number of agents i playing +1 in V e r¡1 and k = 0; 1; 2 the number of agents i playing +1 in V e r =V e r¡1 : Then r = e r is locally stable for agent i if and only if (supposing wlog N odd): k = 2;
3. Suppose that r i = 2; :::; e r ¡ 1: Let h the number of agents playing +1 in V r¡1 and k r = 0; 1; 2 be the number of agents playing +1 in the set V i;r nV i;r¡1 : Then r = r i is locally stable for agent i if and only if k r 6 = f0; 1g and:
Proof. We prove here only the case r i = 1 (proofs of cases 2 and 3 are similar but require heavier computations). Consider …rst SS inequalities that (h; k) must satisfy in order for (+1; 1) to be stable for given the strategy choice s i = +1: Since x 1¸m axf ¡°g: This implies h > 1 and k ¡ h · 4°; which is always satis…ed for any°> 0 unless when h = 1 and k = 2; where we need°¸1 2 : If we now add constraints implied by the inequalities concerning a strategy switch, then the only additional restrictions come from the fact that x 2¸1 ¡ x 1 ¡°, which implies 4 ¡ 3h ¡ k · 4°: As h = 1; 2 and k = 0; 1; 2; the (lhs) of the last inequality is always · 0 unless (h; k) = (1; 0), where we need°¸1 4 :
Given Lemma 5, it is now easy to see that the following con…gurations are SS in which strategy heterogeneity sustains neighborhood homogeneity.
Example 6 Consider the following example (N = 21). Then, the following con…guration: {-1,-1,-1,+1,+1,+1,+1,+4,+4,-10,+2,+1,+1,-4,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1}, where (sign)x means s = (sign)1 and r = x; is a SS for°· 8=(7 ¤ 21):
To see that this is the case, it su¢ces to apply conditions given in Lemma 5 to any agent i. ¥
B The E¤ect of Negative Local Network Externalities
In this Section we will better characterize the e¤ect of negative local externalities. We will focus on the extreme case in which an agent currently playing (+1; r), no matter local frequencies (x r¡1 ; x r ; x r+1 ), would have an incentive to either always shrink her radius to r¡1, keep r, or enlarge to r¡1: We will show that negative network externalities engenders an asymmetric e¤ect on players incentives because there exist regions of the parameter space in which agents are always willing to shrink no matter local frequencies, but the same is not true as far as incentives to keep or enlarge are concerned. More formally:
Proposition 7 Consider an agent playing (wlog) +1 and holding a r¡radius neighborhood, r¸2. Then:
the agent will switch to (r ¡ 1; ¡1) no matter local frequencies.
2. There are no°s.t. given N an agent will switch to r + 1 or keep r no matter local frequencies.
Proof. Consider Point 1. The agent will shrink i¤ x r ¡ x r¡1 <°and x r+1 ¡ x r¡1 < 2°. If we let x r¡1 = h=2(r ¡ 1); x r = (h + k r )=2r and x r+1 = (h + k r + k r+1 )=2(r + 1); then the latter inequalities are satis…ed i¤:
The extreme case for an agent willing to shrink is k r+1 = 2; k r = 2 and h + k r = r (i.e. h = r ¡ 2). In this circumstance (and consequently in any other one), the agent will shrink i¤°>°¤ = [2(r ¡ 1)] ¡1 :When allowed to update her strategy (e.t. else being equal), her local frequency will be
, so that the agent will switch to ¡1.
Consider now point 2. For an agent to keep r, it must be that:
Here the extreme case is: k r+1 = 2; k r = 0 and h + k r = h = 2(r ¡ 1); so that x r = (r ¡ 1)=r¸1=2. The …rst inequality reads ¡(1=r)¸°which is not possible. Therefore, the agent will never keep r irrespective of frequencies. Finally, suppose that an agent would always be willing to enlarge. Then it must be that:
In the extreme case (i.e. k r+1 = 0; k r = 2 and h + k r = 2r) the inequalities above cannot be simultaneously satis…ed. Finally notice that, for any given°, there exists a threshold r ¤ (°) = (1 + 2°)=2°s.t. if an agent holds a radius r > r ¤ (°) then it will always shrink and switch action. However, such r 0 s are possible only if N¸N (°) = b2r ¤ (°) + 1c = b 1+3°°c + 1.
C Coexistence of Conventions and Population Size
We provide here the intuition behind the increase in average coordination due to a growing population size (when the interaction radii are drawn at random from f1; 2; :::; bN=2cg). Suppose that µ = 0 (the conclusion will hold a fortiori when µ > 0). Then:
Proposition 8 For any given N , let a heterogeneous strategy con…guration be given. For any pair of adjacent agents (i; i + 1) playing opposite strategies, say (+1; ¡1) and holding radii (r i ; r i+1 ) = (r + p; r); where r¸1 and p¸0, then the number of common neighbors playing +1 who are necessary for the above con…guration to be locally stable increases as r increases.
Proof. Suppose …rst that p > 0: If (r i ; r i+1 ) = (r + p; r) then V i = fi ¡ r ¡ p; :::; i¡r; i¡r +1; :::; i¡1; i+1 ; i+2; :::; i+r +1 ; i+r +2; :::; i+r +pg and V i+1 = fi+1¡r; :::; i ; i + 2; :::; i + r + 1g: Hence V i \ V i+1 = fi ¡ r + 1; :::; i ¡ 1; i + 2; :::; i + r + 1g: There are 2r ¡ 1 common neighbors and 2p agents belonging to V i nV i+1 : Let h and h p the number of agents playing +1 respectively in V i \ V i+1 and V i nV i+1 : Hence local frequencies must satisfy:
x i (r + p) = h p + h 2(r + p)¸1 2 ; x i+1 (r) = h + 1 2r · 1 2 ;
which is possible i¤ h p¸p + 1 and r + p ¡ h p · h · r ¡ 1: As r grows, h must grow. If conversely p = 0, it is easy to show along the same lines that we need h = r ¡ 1: Therefore, if N grows and r i 2 f1; 2; :::; bN=2cg; agents will hold on average larger neighborhoods. Consequently, the number of common neighbors choosing +1 must grow for any pair of adjacent agents playing opposite strategies. This will of course systematically destroy heterogeneous strategy con…gurations as N becomes larger. Average Strategy Average Radius N = 51 c = 0:00 c = 1:00 c = 1:99 c = 0:00 c = 1:00 c = 1:99 µ = 1:0 1.00 0.18 -1.00 1.00 1.13 1.00 = 10 ¡6 µ = 0:1 0.84 -0.03 -1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 µ = 1:0 1.00 0.01 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 = 1:5 µ = 0:1 1.00 -0.05 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Table 2 : MC Means of Average Strategy (s m ) and Average Radius when the underlying stage-game is a generic coordination game. The parameter c measures the risk-e¢ciency of (-1,-1). Parameter Setup: c = 0: (+1,+1) PE and RD; c = 1: (+1,+1) and (-1,-1) risk equivalent; c = 1:99: (-1,-1) is RD. MC Sample Size M = 1000:
